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HOMICIDE IN RESISTING ARREST
By A. W. G. K *
"Intentional killing of arresting officer is murder", says
the headline in Wharton.1 "When a party who having authori-
ty to arrest or imprison uses the proper means on a proper
occasion for such a purpose, and in so doing is assaulted and
killed, it will be murder in all concerned if the intent be to kill
or inflict grievous bodily hurt." Chapter and verse, ancient
and modern, are cited as authority for this statement of the
law, a statement which seems to be accepted both in England
and the United States with very little question.2
At the same time, Mr. Dickey, in his article in the Cornell
Law Quarterly,3 points out, quite accurately, that it is difficult
to find a case of murder in resisting arrest where malice afore-
thought could not have been based on some other ground. Indeed,
if we look again at Wharton's statement of the law, it may
occur to us that "if the intent be to kill or inflict grievous
bodily hurt", the killing is murder, whether the victim be a
peace officer or not: so that there seems to be little point in having
a special rule to cover resistance to arrest. Perhaps it may be
of value if we turn aside from the whirlpool of modern Amer.
ican case-law and retreat to the quiet backwater of the Eng-
lish reports where at the end of the sixteenth century the foun-
dations of the present rule of resisting arrest were laid.
I
The first trace of this rule seems to be in Crompton's en-
largement of Fitzherbert's little book on the Justice of the
* B. A., Cambridge University, 1935; Foundation Scholar of
Queen's College, Cambridge; Entrance Scholar of the Inner Temple;
Commonwealth Fund Fellow, Harvard Law School, 1936-8. Address:
Langdell Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.
LCriminal Law (1932), vol. 1, p. 778. All italics used in quota-
tions are ours.
2 Doubt about the rule is expressed in the standard students' text-
book in England. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 14th ed., p. 141.
3 "Culpable Homicide in Resisting Arrest", 18 Cornell L. Q. 373
(1933). Kenney (1902 ed.) 139, seems to have made a similar
suggestion.
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Peace. In this, which appeared in 1583, we are told that if a
sheriff or justice of the peace comes to suppress rioters, and one
of those who come with the sheriff or justice is killed by one
of the rioters, that is murder in him as well as in all the other
rioters present.4 No reasons or authority are given for this
statement, though it seems as if Crompton is giving an account
of an actual case.
Three years later, in 1586, Yong's Case5 was decided at
Sussex Assizes. Here one Garland took a sword and cut off the
nose, together with part of the lips and chin, of one Butcher,
who seems to have been a peace officer lawfully doing his duty.
After this piece of facial surgery, Yong, the other defendant,
took another sword and smote Butcher through the chest as
deep as the shoulder bone. Butcher died. This was held to
be murder in both, the whole court agreeing that the killing of
a constable or his assistants in the execution of their duty is
murder in law, "althozgh the murderer knew not the party that
was killed, and although the affray was sudden, because the
constable and his assistants came by authority of law to keep the
peace and prevent the danger which might ensue by the breach
of it; and therefore the law will adjadge it murder, and that
the murderer had malice prepense, because he set himself against
the justice of the realm".
Similarly, in Mackalley's Case in Killing a Serjeant of
London,6 twenty-five years later, the judges resolved, where the
accused deliberately killed the serjeant according to Croke's
report, "That if any sheriff, under-sheriff, serjeant or officer,
who hath execution of process, be slain in doing his duty, it is
murder in him who kills him, although there was not any former
malice betwixt them,; for the executing of process is the life of
the law: and therefore he who kills him shall lose his life; for
that "offence is contra potestatem, regis et legis;7 and therefore
in such case there needs not any inquiry of malice." 8
Exactly the same thing was said in Pew's Case in 1634,
'Crompton (1583 ed.), f. 15b.
54 Co. Rep. 40a (1586).
9 Co. Rep. 65b; Cro. Jac. 279 (1611).
"'Against the power of the king and the law".8Cro. Jac. 280.
KENTUCKY LAW JOUnNAL
where the accused drew his sword and ran the arresting bailiff
through the middle.9
II
The reason why we have set these cases out at length is
to permit the reader to notice for himself the point of Mr.
Dickey's observation: every one of these early authorities, the
original sources of our present rule of law, might have been
decided on some other ground. In each case the killing is de-
liberate; why then did the judges fail to say that every deliber-
ate killing implies malice aforethought, without going to the
trouble of laying down a special rule to cover deliberate killing
in resisting arrest? Does it not seem that the rule was, at any
rate when it began, superfluous?
Coke and Croke and the other English judges who decided
these early cases were not the kind to invent a new rule where
an old rule would do just as well. A short examination of the
condition of the law of malice aforethought at the time when
these cases were decided will, it is hoped, show that Mr. Dickey
is wrong in thinking that Yong's Case and Mackalley's Case
'and the other early authorities could have been decided on
grounds other than malice aforethought in resisting arrest, and
that Coke, Croke and the judges in these cases were meeting a
want of the time when they invented this new rule.
III
Malice aforethought to-day is a technical term, with vari-
ous technical meanings: one of these is intent to kill; another is
intent to do a serious injury; another is intent to resist arrest.
In earlier times, however, when malice aforethought first be-
came the distinction between murder and other felonious homi-
cides, the expression had no technical construction but meant
exactly what it said. There had to be malice and there had to
be forethought; in other words there had to be a plot against
the life of the deceased, resulting from some previous grudge or
grievance.10
ICro. Car. 183 (1634).
10 f. Hale, 1 P. 0. 451: "The evidence of such a[n express]
malice must arise from external circumstances discovering that
inward intention, as lying in wait, menacings antecedents, former
grudges, deliberate compassings, and the like .... '
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There are one or two early cases to be found in which the
prosecution had to go to the trouble of proving this grudge and
this scheming. In one case" A and B meet and B kills A; this
was murder because A had previously brought an appeal of
felony against B. Therefore, says, Crompton, it will be under-
stood that B had malice against A because A was seeking his
life by that appeal. Similarly, when a gaoler killed his prisoner,
it was held to be murder, because the gaoler suspected that the
prisoner had been too familiar with his wife.12
Later, it came to be said that if a man killed another with-
out any provocation or other apparent sudden cause, scheming
of the killing must be implied, otherwise the killing would not
have happened at all. In a case in 1610,13 Yelverton, J., said:
". .. the law is clear that this is murder, and it is
no excuse for him to say that he bore no malice to him. be-
fore; for if one stab another, this shall be murder, for the
Law in such cases doth presume malice to be in him, other-
wise this would not have so hapned (sic), and this the Law
calls malice apparent; and though the same cannot be
proved it is not material."
IV
*Why is it, then, that deliberate killing of a peace officer
making an arrest is not covered by the rule that deliberate kill-
ing implies both malice and forethought, "otherwise this would
not have so hapned"? Why was there any need for the in-
vention of a new rule ? The answer seems to be that the impli-
cation of malice from deliberate killing could only be made
when there was no explanation for the killing other than a pre-
vious plot. Hot blood caused by provocation, even though the
provocation took the form of a lawful attempt to arrest, was
clearly a very good reason for a sudden desire to kill, so that
the argument that without some kind of previous malice the
killing would not have occurred was not applicable to this case.
Moreover, it was felt that, since the killer was not previously
acquainted with the deceased, it was difficult to imply a plot to
"Crompton (1583 ed.), f. 15b.
"Crompton (1593 ed.), f. 20a; heard before Serjeant Shuttleworth
at Chester Assizes in 1589.
"Morgan's Case, 1 Bulstrode 86 (1610).
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take his life, so that there was every reason to classify the kill-
ing in the scuffle following an attempt to arrest as homicide in
a sudden affray.
At the same time it was realized that unless killing of this
kind were somehow made into murder, the law's executive force
would be seriously diminished, for manslaughter at that time
was an offence for which the first offender could escape serious
punishment by means of benefit of clergy. It was necessary to
prove some kind of malice aforethought, "although the murderer
knew not the party that was killed, and although the affray was
sudden." In Yong's Case,14 which seems to be the first reported
case in which the new rule is found, the judges said that
"the law will adjudge it murder, and that the murderer had
malice prepense, because he set himself against the justice of the
realm". Perhaps it is dangerous ex post facto reasoning to
argue from these words that a plot against the justice of the
realm was substituted for a plot against the individual officer,
so that the offence could be made into murder although there
was provocation in the sudden affray and although the officer
was previously unknown to the offender.
However that may be, reasoning to explain the extension
of malice aforethought soon disappeared, and it is not long be-
fore we find the judges saying that where a peace officer is killed
in this way, no malice aforethought need be proved at all. In
Mackalley's Case, in 1611, the judges said that "there need be
no inquiry of malice". 15
V
Our conclusion then is that although the rule that killing
a peace officer while resisting arrest is murder may be, as Mr.
Dickey implies, superfluous to-day, it was not superfluous when
the rule first began: it filled an inconvenient lacuna caused by
the difficulty of presuming a previous plot where there was
patently a sudden affray and where the killer and killed were
previously unknown to each other. It is perhaps worth while
to point out in conclusion that the rule, when it began, was
meant to deal only with the deliberate killing of the officer, and
not with causing his death by accident of some kind.10
2144 Co. Rep. 40a (1586).
'59 Co. Rep. 65b; Cro. Jac. 279 (1611).
161 am grateful to Professor Livingston Hall, of the Harvard Law
School, and Professor Roy Moreland, of the Kentucky Law School,
for their criticism and advice.
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